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ESSAY
STILL FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THE NINELIVED CAT: A REBUTTAL TO RAOUL
BERGER'S REPLY ON APPLICATION OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO THE
STATES
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS t

Recently, there has been much debate over the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. One group of commentators, typified by Raoul
Berger,argues thatthefourteenth amendment was intendedonly toprohibit discriminationin a narrowclass of rights. Others,such as author
Michael Curtis, argue that thefourteenth amendment was intended to
guaranteeafar broaderclass of rights againststate infringement. In
thisArticle, Mr. Curtisexamines the legislativehistory of thefourteenth
amendment and the meaning of terms such as "privileges or immunities" as they were defned by Blackstone. He responds to Raoul Berger's earlier criticisms of his position, and concludes that both the
legislativehistory andafresh look at Blackstone's Commentaries indicate that the Congressintended to incorporatethe guaranteesofthe Bill
of Rights in thefourteenth amendment.
Raoul Berger says the objective of the fourteenth amendment was narrow.' It was designed only to prohibit discrimination among citizens of a state
in a narrow class of "fundamental" rights. 2 Berger even says that the due
process clause could not be violated by a nondiscriminatory state law.3 Occasionally he seems to admit that the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment protected absolute, fundamental, substantive rights that
states could not abridge--the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property.
Berger suggests, however, that these broad phrases should be read narrowly
and be limited, more or less, to the right to testify, sue, contract, and hold
property.4 There are extremely serious problems with Berger's analysis of the
fourteenth amendment, problems highlighted by Berger's latest response to my
t Partner, Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy, Greensboro, North Carolina.
A.B. 1964, University of the South; J.D. 1969, North Carolina (Chapel Hill). © Copyright 1984 by

Michael Kent Curtis.
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JunIcIARY 37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]; Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Berger,.4 Reply] For a thoughtful analysis of the legitimacy issue, see,
L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT (1975).

2. Berger, .4Reply, supra note I, at 3.
3. Id at 5.
4. Id at 13-15.
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criticism of his work.5
Berger's claim that the fourteenth amendment is identical to the Civil
Rights Bill 6 and his claim that the Bill merely prohibited discrimination in
certain fundamental rights a state chose to accord its citizens 7 makes the due
process and privileges or immunities clauses superfluous. If the purpose of
section I of the fourteenth amendment were only to prohibit discrimination in
certain fundamental rights, then to say "[N]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law" is a very odd way of saying so. By this reading the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" that no state could
abridge would be determined by local law, and the privileges could be
abridged as long as the deprivation was not discriminatory.
Beyond linguistic problems, there are a number of serious objections to
Berger's analysis. Two of the three members of the Joint Committee that reported the fourteenth amendment to Congress indicated that it was designed
to make the states obey the commands of the Bill of Rights.8 During the debates a number of their colleagues said that the amendment was designed to
secure all rights of citizens of the United States-statements that are consistent
with application of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states. 9 These
statements must be read in light of the widespread Republican belief that
states already were required to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights prior
to the passage of the fourteenth amendment and that on this issue, as on the
issue of black citizenship, the fourteenth amendment was declaratory. 10
Because of a long history of denial of individual liberties in the South
before the Civil War, there were strong policy reasons for Republicans explicitly to impose the guarantees of the Bill of Rights on the states."1 After the
fourteenth amendment was passed, and before the Supreme Court eviscerated
the privileges or immunities clause, a number of leading Republicans indicated that they believed the amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to
5. Id The reply was a response to Curtis, FurtherAdventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A
Response to Mr. Bergeron Incorporationof the Bill ofRights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Curtis, FurtherAdventures], which in turn responded to Berger's Incorporationofthe
Bill of Rights in the FourteenthAmendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Incorporation], which in turn responded to Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a
Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAr FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Curtis, The Bill ofRfthts], which in turn responded to R. BEROER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

6. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976)).
7. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 4-5.
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2542 (1866) (Rep. Bingham); 2765-66 (Sen. Howard)
[hereinafter cited for this Congress and session as GLOBE]. See also id at 1034 (Rep. Bingham).
9. Id. at 3038 (Sen. Yates); 3167 (Rep. Windom); 3201 (Rep. Orth); app. 210 (Rep. Bundy);

app. 256 (Rep. Baker).
10. See, e.g., id at 340 (Sen. Cowan); 1075 (Sen. Trumbull); 1183 (Sen. Pomeroy); 1628-29
(Rep. Hart); app. 67 (Rep. Garfield); 1837 (Rep. Lawrence). See also Curtis, The Fourteenth

Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237, 251-56 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment].
11. Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment, supra note 10, at 242-44, 251-52.
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the states.' 2 A common description of section 131 during the campaign of 1866
was that it would protect all rights of citizens.
In the face of direct evidence from the leading supporters of the fourteenth amendment that they intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states,
Berger relies on two very questionable inferences. The first is that the privileges or immunities clause should be read in light of article IV, section 2 to
protect what Berger considers a narrow class of rights defined by the Civil
Rights Bill. 14 The second is that the Civil Rights Bill should be treated as an
exact equivalent to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, thus, supposedly,
disproving an intent to apply the Bill of Rights to the states-because, Berger
free to grant or withhold any rights as long as they
believes, the Act left states
5
did not discriminate.'
I.

PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES

Leading Republicans read article IV, section 2 to protect the absolute,
fundamental rights of citizens to life, liberty or property. 16 I have criticized
Berger for focusing on some of the incidents of these great fundamental rights
that were set out in the Civil Rights Bill (e.g., the right to testify; the right to
purchase and sell property), instead of the overarching principles from which
they were derived. 17 If leading Republicans read the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV, section 2 and of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to protect rights to personal security, personal liberty, and private
property, this expression was broad enough to encompass rights in the Bill of
Rights.
Berger finds my analysis wrong because it ignores the "Blackstonian confines" that he believes shaped the meaning of the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment. He cites remarks by James Wilson,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and notes:
Resort to "overarching" principles does not expand "life, liberty or
property" beyond the Blackstonian confines to which Wilson directed the framers' attention. The right to locomotion without restraint does not secure free speech; protection of life and limb does
not guarantee against excessive bail for a murderer; the right to own
property does not insure trial by jury in a suit concerning more than
twenty dollars.'
Wilson had argued that the federal government could legislate to protect
12. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 5, at 115-19.
13. Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment, supra note 10, at 281-92.
14. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 8.

15. Id at5.
16. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 157-58, 430, 1088 (Rep. Bingham); 1118 (Rep. Wilson); 1757
(Sen. Trumbull); 1833 (Rep. Lawrence). For a discussion of Bingham's views, see Curtis, The
FourteenthAmendment, supra note 10, at 259-6 1. For a discussion of Wilson's views, see Curtis,
FurtherAdventures supra note 5, at 98-100.
17. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 5, at 96.
18. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 15. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1118 (Rep. Wilson).
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the great fundamental rights of citizens. He stated that these "must be as comprehensive as those which belong to Englishmen. Blackstone classfles them
under three articles," 19 as follows:
1. The right of personal security; which, he says, "Consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health and his reputation."
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says, "Consists in the
power of locomotion, of changing situtation, or moving one's person
to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be, "The free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without
any con'20
trol or diminution save only by the laws of the land."
Since Berger insists that the absolute rights of an individual-the right to
personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property-must be interpreted according to Blackstone, a careful examination of
Blackstone is in order. Blackstone notes:
The absolute rights of every Englishman (which, taken in a political
and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties,) as they are
founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of
government. ... [T]he balance of our rights and liberties has settled to its proper level; and theirfundamental articleshave beenfrom
time to time
assertedin parliament,as often they were thought to be in
danger.2 1
Blackstone then cites the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas
Corpus Act, the English Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement. 2 2 The
Magna Carta, of course, was the origin of our due process clause 23 and was
read by colonists to protect trial by jury.24 The Petition of Right listed rights
such as due process, the right to habeas corpus, and the right not to have
troops quartered in private homes. 25 The English Bill of Rights provided that
"excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted," that jurors should be duly impanelled,
that subjects had the right to petition the King for redress of grievances and
that all commitments and prosecutions for such petitionings were illegal, and
that "Protestants" had a right to have arms for their defense as allowed by
26
law.
After listing such documents as the Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act,
the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights, Blackstone says:
19.
20.
21.
22.

GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1118 (emphasis added).
Id at 1118 (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *123.
Id. at *127-28.

*129-38).

23. B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 7 (1977).

24. 2 L. WROTH & H. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 200-02 (1965).
25. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 17-19, 20-21 (1971).
26. Id at 40-41, 42-43.
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Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights
themselves thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a number
of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that residiuum of natural
liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to
public convenience; or else those civilprivileges, which society hath
engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by
individuals. These therefore were formerly, either by inheritence or
purchase, the rights of all mankind; but.

. .

they at present may be

said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the right of the
people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or
primaryarticles;the rightofpersonalsecurity, the right ofpersonalliberty, and the right of privateproperty; because, as there is no other
known method of compulsion, or of abridgingman's naturalfree will,
but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these important
rights,the preservationof these, inviolate, mayjustly be saidto include
of our civil immunities in their largest andmost extenthepreservation
27
sive sense.
Blackstone wrote that there are absolute rights of Englishmen and that
their fundamental articles from time to time have been asserted in Parliament.
He then runs down some of the great acts of Parliament that were precursors
to the American Bill of Rights and that represent the declaration of rights and
liberties of Englishmen. These he says consist of "immunities" and "privileges." These various immunities and privileges can be reduced to three primary articles: personal security, personal liberty, and the right to private
property-because an infringement of any of the important rights set out in
any of the great acts of Parliament could not be accomplished without some
invasion of one of the three fundamental rights. For Blackstone the absolute
rights of Englishmen encompass all their liberties. Rather than excluding the
liberties in the Bill of Rights, Blackstone's three primary articles include the
Bill of Rights and may include far more. In short, Berger's reliance on the
Blackstonian heritage to exclude Bill of Rights liberties is misplaced.
Mr. Berger also relies on Representative Lawrence's statement that "all
privileges" in article IV, section 2, had been construed to mean "some" privileges. 28 The statement is used by Berger to show that the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment did not apply the Bill of Rights to the
states. So Lawrence's statement, too, should be carefully examined.
In his defense of the Civil Rights Bill, Representative Lawrence noted
that there was a national citizenship. And "citizenship implies certain rights
which are to be protected, and imposes the duty of allegiance and obediance to
the laws."'29 He notes that the Continental Congress of 1774 in their Declara27. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *129 (emphasis added). My law partner Charles Lloyd
directed my attention to Blackstone's use of "privileges" and "immunities."
28. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 8. The statement on which Berger relies is taken from
Lawrence's defense of the Civil Rights Bill, a defense from which I quote at length below. See

infra text accompanying notes 30-33

29. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1832 (Rep. Lawrence).
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tion of Rights declared:
That the inhabitants of the English colonies of North America, by
the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the following rights:
"Resolve that they are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and that
they have never ceded any sovereign
Power whatever right to dispose
30
of either without their consent."
Lawrence noted that citizens have certain absolute rights including personal
security, personal property, and liberty and that the Bill of Rights of the national constitutution declared that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without just compensation:
Without further authority I may assume, then, that there are certain
absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and
of which a state cannot consitutionaly deprive him....
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of
personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property. These are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of
these absolute rights, there are others, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share
the beneft of lawsfor the security ofperson andproperty. .... 31
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the
nation in the enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and
property, and the means essential to that end, by penal enactments to
enforce the observance of the provisions of the Constitution, article
four, section 2, and the equal civil rights which it recognizes or by
implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State. Congress has the incidental power to enforce and protect the equal enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are inherent in national
citizenship. The Constitution declares these civil rights to be inherent in every citizen, and Congress has power to enforce the declaration. If it has not, then the Declaration of Rights is in vain, and we
have a Government powerless to secure and protect rights which the
Constitution solemnly declares every citizen shall have.32
Lawrence concluded that the privileges referred to in the Constitution
"are such as are fundamental civil rights, not political rights nor those depen'33
dent on local law."
Leading Republicans such as Congressman Bingham and James Wilson,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, had read article IV to protect rights in
the Bill of Rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due
process of law, a reading shared by others.3 4 The gloss put on article IV was
that it protected absolute, fundamental rights of American citizens to life, lib30. Id at 1833.
31. Id at 1833 (emphasis added).
32. Id at 1835.
33. Id at 1836.
34. Id at 1263 (Rep. Broomall); 1629 (Rep. Hart); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess, 1202
(1864) (Rep. Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (Rep. Bingham),
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erty, and property. A reading of Blackstone and Lawrence tends to confirm,
rather than deny, the impression that leading Republicans construed article
IV, section 2 to protect the basic liberties of American citizens including guarantees such as those set out in the Bill of Rights.
As a consequence of his limited reading of the rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, Berger insists that the amendment does not secure free
speech, or protect against excessive bail, or ensure the right to a jury trial in a
suit concerning more than twenty dollars. 35 Regarding the due process clause,
Berger cites a speech (made after the amendment was ratified) by William
Lawrence of Ohio, "a leading legal theorist in the 39th Congress," 3 6 and
quotes Lawrence's quotation from Alexander Hamilton to prove a restricted
reading of due process of law. 37 An examination of Lawrence's speech in full
shows that Berger's reliance is misplaced.
In the speech that Berger cites to support a limited reading of due process
of law, Lawrence complained about an act of Congress that failed to provide
for a jury trial in certain eminent domain proceedings. Lawrence insisted that
the seventh amendment guarantee to a jury trial was included within fifth
amendment due process and also was encompassed in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment as well as in the privileges and immunities
38

clause.

Although Berger argues that the fourteenth amendment only protects a
limited class of rights and does not ensure "trial by jury in a suit concerning
more than twenty dollars,

'3 9

William Lawrence, in the page of his speech Ber-

ger cites in his article, disagreed with this analysis. Lawrence noted:
Now let us see what securityforproperly our own great Constitution
has provided. The fifth article of amendments provides that"No person... shall be. . deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
without just compensation."
In article seven it is provided that"In suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
The fourteenth article of amendments contains a provision as
follows:
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
And by this same article "the privileges and immunities of citizens"
are protected so that they cannot be abridged by State authority.
And now what mean all these sacred guarantees? 4°
Lawrence concluded that:
35. Berger, A Repl,, supra note 1, at 15.

36. Id at 8.
37. Id at 5 n.38. See infra text accompanying note 44.
38. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1244-45 (1871).
39. See Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 15.
40. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871).
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[W]here the power of eminent domain is to be exercised under State
authority.
a trial at law by a common law jury is now [a] matter
of constitutional right. I know doubts have been entertained on this
subject prior to the adoption of the fourteenth article of amendments
to the Constitution. . ..

But since the adoption of the fourteenth

article, it4 1may well be maintained that a common law jury trial is
secured.
Lawrence seems to have disagreed with the original interpretation that the
seventh amendment did not limit the states: "The true original interpretation
of the Constitution ought to have been that the right of trial by jury was preserved by it."42

Many of the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights are "process"
guarantees. Prior to the framing of the fourteenth amendment, in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land andImprovement Co. ,43 the Court suggested that the
procedural guarantees set out in the Constitution were part of the process required by the due process clause." Lawrence cited the same case as authority
for the proposition that "Congress cannot arbitrarily '45
by law declare that to be
due process of law which is not so at common law."
Berger's analysis is deficient in two ways. First, since the framers believed
that the rights of citizens of the United States that justified passage of the Civil
Rights Bill were absolute, these rights cannot be viewed as merely encompassing a right against discrimination. As to these rights, at least, states cannot
grant or withhold them as they please. Second, Berger's conclusion that these
absolute fundamental rights clearly excluded Bill of Rights liberties is simply
wrong.
II.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL

In addition to his argument founded on article IV, section 2, Berger, by
citing the Civil Rights Bill, also seeks to overcome direct evidence that the
framers did intend to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. The crux of Berger's argument is that the Civil Rights Bill specified certain rights such as
equal right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
etc., and that, therefore, the Civil Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment
were designed to protect against discrimination only in these rights. Bill of
Rights liberties were not to be protected. 46 The Civil Rights Bill had been
justified on the theory that the Congress had the power to protect citizens of
the United States in their fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property, or
their fundamental rights to personal liberty, personal security, and private
41. Id
42. Id
43. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
44. Id at 277. See Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1954).
45. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871).
46. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 3-10, 14-16.
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property.47 In support of this argument, Berger notes that the framers relied
on Blackstone. The principle advocated by Republicans in support of the pasto
sage of the Civil Rights Bill was that the federal government had the power
48
protect its citizens from state interference with their fundamental rights.
Initially the Civil Rights Bill had provided that "[t]here shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United
States." 49 Berger takes great comfort from the fact that the phrase "no discrimination in civil rights or immunities" was eliminated. This proves to Berger that only a limited category of enumerated rights was to be protected and
these, he believes, excluded the rights in the Bill of Rights. 50
The first problem with this analysis is that the controversy over "no discrimination in civil rights or immunities" was centered on rights under state
law such as suffrage, not federal constitutional rights such as those in the Bill
of Rights. 5 1 The elimination of the phrase was designed to ensure that certain
rights under state law-such as suffrage-were not included in the Civil
Rights Bill. Since there was no controversy about Bill of Rights liberties, the
elimination of the phrase proves nothing about rights in the Bill of Rights.
Bingham had objected that the phrase "civil rights or immunities" embraced every right, state or federal, belonging to any citizen, and had urged
that it be deleted. Even with its deletion, he insisted that a constitutional
amendment would be required to empower Congress to pass the Civil Rights
Bill.5 2 Wilson denied that the phrase encompassed rights belonging to citizens

of the United States and all rights conferred on any citizen of a state:
He knows, as every man knows, that this Bill refers to those rights
which belong to man as citizens of the United States and none other;
when he talks of setting aside the school laws and jury laws and
franchise laws of the States by the Bill now under consideration53he
steps beyond what he must know to be the rule of construction.
Wilson then said that the rights of citizens of the United States that Congress
could require the states to respect included rights in the Bill of Rights. 54 The
fourteenth amendment provided that no state could abridge the "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." So the substitution of "privileges" of citizens of the United States for "civil rights" merely emphasizes the
47. See supra note 16.
48. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 14 n.124. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1294 (Rep. Wilson);
1153, 1270 (Rep. Thayer). Wilson and Thayer believed that Congress could legislate to enforce
the right to life, liberty, and property under the fifth amendment. Bingham had argued that a
constitutional amendment was required before Congress could have legislative authority to enforce the guarantees of the Bill of Rights in the states. Id at 1291-92 (Rep. Bingham).
49. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1291.
50. Berger, A Rep/l, supra note 1, at 8.
51. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1366 (Rep. Wilson), 1151 (Rep. Thayer).
52. See supra note 48.
53. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1294 (Rep. Wilson).
54. Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment, supra note 9, at 273 (citing GLOBE, supra note 8, at

1291-92).
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framers' intent to apply all the guarantees of the federal constitution to the
states.
The second problem with Berger's use of the Civil Rights Bill is that the
language of the Bill indicates that Republicans believed rights referred to in it
included Bill of Rights liberties. The Civil Rights Act made all persons born
in the United States citizens and provided that such citizens,
without regard to race, color or previous condition of slavery...
shall have the same right, in every State and territory of the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens. .... 55
Rights in the Bill of Rights had been described as provisions for the security of person and property both before and after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment. 56 That the Civil Rights Bill contained a phrase broad enough to
include protection of Bill of Rights liberties further supports the argument that
the absolute fundamental rights from which Republicans derived the power to
pass the Bill were sufficiently broad to encompass liberties in the Bill of
57
Rights.
Similar language had appeared in the Freedman's Bureau Bill. The
Freedman's Bureau Bill also had originally referred to full and equal benefit
to all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property. The Bill
was amended in the House to provide, among other things, for "the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate,
including the constitutional right of bearing arms."'5 8 The addition of the
phrase, "including the constitutional right of bearing arms" (secured by the
second amendment) shows that Republicans read the phrase "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate" as
sufficiently broad to encompass constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights. Senator Trumbull, speaking of the addition of the phrase, "including the constitutional right of bearing arms," to "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and estate" said that this amendment
59
did not change the meaning of the section.
In what may be an effort to deal with the apparent meaning of the phrase
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property," a phrase Republicans read as broad enough to encompass Bill
of Rights liberties, Berger points out that the phrase "civil rights or immunities" was eliminated from the Civil Rights Bill to obviate "a construction going beyond the specific rights named in the section," a "latitudinarian
55. Act. of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
56. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 5, at 105 & 124. See Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 10, at 271.
57. See Curtis, The Fourteenth 4mendment, supra note 10, at 271-72.
58. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 743. See id at 654 & 1292.
59. Id at 743.
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construction not intended."60
On the issue under consideration this fact proves very little. What is significant is that the phrase "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property" was not deleted and remained in the
Bill.
When he spoke about the deletion of the general terms relating to civil
rights, Wilson noted that he did not consider the change material. He further
noted that some congressmen had been concerned that the Bill could be construed to affect the right of sufferage. Consequently the general terms were
61
struck out and the Bill was left with "the rights specified in the section.
These rights, as a reading of the Bill shows, continued to include the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
In another attempt to show that the fourteenth amendment did not include rights in the Bill of Rights, Berger cites Congressman Thayer's statement
that "the rights enumerated in the [Civil Rights Bill] preclude[d]" extension of
62
the general words "beyond the particulars which had been enumerated."
Thayer's remarks are of no help to Berger, however, because his statements
were made in response to assertions that the Civil Rights Bill's protection of
"civil rights and immunities" included the state law right to vote. Thayer denied the claim. He noted that the words were "civil rights and immunities,"
not political privileges. Then he noted that the matter was "put beyond all
doubt by the subsequent particular definition of the general language which
has been just used." 63 "[E]numeration precludes any possibility that the general words which have been used extend beyond the particulars which have
been enumerated." 64 The general words referred to were the words "civil
rights or immunities." After arguing again that sufferage was not included,
Thayer said:
Why should not these fundamental rights and immunities which are
common to the humblest citizen of every free State, be extended to
these citizens? Why should they be deprived of the right to make
and enforce contracts, of the right to sue, of the right to be parties,
and give evidence in courts of justice, of the right to inherit,
purchase, lease, hold, and convey real and personal property? And
of alllaws andproceedwhy should they not havefull andequalbenefit
65
ingsfor the security ofperson andproperty?
Berger's presentation might lead a reader to believe that the specific rights
Thayer was talking about excluded the rights to "full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." A reading of
Thayer's remarks in context, however, makes clear that the general phrase he
60. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).
61. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1366.
62. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 8 (citing GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1151).

63. GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1151 (Rep. Thayer).
64. Id
65. Id (emphasis added).
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discussed was "civil rights and immunities" and that the particular rights that
he believed limited the general phrase included "the full and equal benefit of
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Thayer believed that Congress had the power to pass the Civil Rights Bill because of its
power to enforce guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights:
If, then, the freemen are now citizens, or if we have the constitutional
power to make them such, they are clearly entitled to those guarantees of the Constitution of the United States which are intended for
the protection of all citizens.
They are entitled to the benefit of that guarantee of the Constitution which secures to every citizen the enjoyment of life, liberty,
and property and no just reason exists why they should
not enjoy the
protection of that guarantee of the Constitution. 66
Sometimes a congressman or senator seems to describe the Civil Rights
Bill as securing equal rights to blacks and not limiting state law in any other
way-as if it merely encompassed equal protection. Berger cites Congressman
Shellabarger as saying that the Bill did not confer or define any rights and
only secured equality in those civil rights the state chose to confer on any race.
Exactly what Shellabarger thought on the incorporation issue is unclear. But
his statement on the Civil Rights Bill was qualified more carefully than the
excerpt cited by Berger:
But,sir,except sofar as [the bill confers citizenshp, it neither confers
nor dfines nor regulatesany right whatever. Its whole effect is not to
confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for
and upon all citizens alike67without distinctions based on race or former condition in slavery.

The Civil Rights Act, of course, made all persons born in the United States
and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States and gave such citizens the full and equal benefit of all laws and provisions for the security of
person and property as enjoyed by white citizens. Berger relies on Congressman Shellabarger's statement that the Civil Rights Bill merely secured equality in certain rights that the states chose to confer to prove the fourteenth
amendment only did the same thing. But Shellabarger believed such a read68
ing of the fourteenth amendment was incorrect.
66. Id at 1153.
67. Id at 1293 (Rep. Shellabarger) (emphasis added).

68. SheIlabarger noted in proceedings in memoriam of Chief Justice Waite:
When, therefore, Waite's great opinions construing these Amendments came, one in
Minor's case, in 1874, holding that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not add to the
privileges and immunities of American citizens, but simply adds guaranties for the protection of privileges theretofore existing," and especially when the great opinion appeared, in 1876, in Cruikshank's case, also holding that the "Fourteenth Amendment
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another," and that when the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment inserted therein the provisions creating national citizenship,
prohibiting the abridgment of the privileges thereof, and prohibiting the States from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, or of the equal protection of the laws,
and giving to Congress power to enforce these provisions, suchframers did not mean to
addanythingto the rights ofAmerican citizens save the right to be dealt with as equals,-that
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Senator Trumball, as Berger notes, made some remarks that can be read

as indicating that the Civil Rights Bill only guaranteed equality.69 He also

described "[t]he great fundamental rights, [which are] set forth in [the

CivilRights] [B]ill" as "the right to go and come at pleasure, the rightto enforce
rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of prop-

erty." 70 The ambiguity of the quoted portion, of course, is that it fails to indi-

cate what rights could be enforced in the courts. While Trumball sometimes

described the Civil Rights Bill as simply prohibiting discrimination, he also
said that the law could be justified under the power of the federal government

to ensure freedom to blacks:
[A]nd it is perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not allow a

colored person to go from one county to another is certainly a law in
derogation of the rights of a freeman. A law that. . . does not allow
him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is certainly a law in violation of the71rights of a freeman, and being so may properly be declared void.

In addition to saying that the Bill would have no operation in a state

where the laws were equal, as Berger notes, Trumball also made more careful
statements describing the effect of the Bill: "Each State, so that it does not

abridgethe greatfundamentalrightsbelonging, under the constitution,to all citizens, may grant or withhold such civil rights as it pleases ....,,72
Berger has trapped himself in a series of contradictions. If, as he argues,
73

the fourteenth amendment is absolutely the same as the Civil Rights

Bill,

and since he believes the "Act merely was to secure blacks against discriminatheseframersdidnot design to enable Congressto legislateaffirmativel, and directlyforthe
protectionof civil rights, but only to use correctiveandrestraininglegislationas againstthe
States, then many of theframersof these Amendments received information regardingtheir

intentions which was new, and was not calculated to allay the apprehensions with which
they saw Chief Justice Waite go upon the bench.
Still I am bound to say now, when the lapse ofyears has maturedmen's views and
cooled theirfeelings regardingthe results of the late war, and succeeding decisions have

explained and supplemented these earlier decisions, and have guarded against what was
believed to be their erroneous tendencies, that I am inclined to think the judgment of
history will be that he has been, in the main, steadily right regarding these Amendments;
especially in view of the restraining effect of the later decisions.
I am inclined to think that the position in which is now left the power of the National Government in providing for the defence of the civil and political rights of the
people as members of the Nation, especially as that position is defined in such cases as
Exparte Virginia, Exparte Sieboid, Strauder against West Virginia, and other later and

kindred decisions, is safe and is conservative of our institutions ....
Supreme Court Proceedings In Memoriam, Morrison A Waite, 126 U.S. 585, 600-01 (1877) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1875); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874)).
69. GLOBE, supra note 8,at 476 & 1761. Trumbull suggested that the Civil Rights Bill would
not apply in states that secured equal rights. Id at 600.
70. Id at 475.

71. Id at 475.
72. Id at 1760 (emphasis added).
73. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 3-5.
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tion not to displace undiscriminatory state law," 74 then, it seems clear, the
fourteenth amendment did not protect any absolute rights which states could
not abridge. In addition to being completely inconsistent with the language of
the fourteenth amendment, this approach collides with the way leading proponents of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Bill describe the
amendment and the overarching principles from which they derived the power
to pass the Bill-the absolute rights of "personal security," "personal liberty,"
and "the right to acquire and enjoy property." 7 5 As Senator Trumbull noted,
in arguing for the Civil Rights Bill, "these are declared to be inalienable rights,
belonging to every citizen of the United States. . . no matter where he may
be."'76 If, however, the states could eliminate such rights as long as they did it
for all of their citizens, the rights would not be inalienable. Again, Congressman Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and manager of the Civil
Rights Bill in the House, noted that the rights of personal security, personal
liberty, and the right to acquire property were "inalienable." "The great fundamental rights are the inalienable possession of both Englishmen and Americans." 77 Again, Wilson described the "right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property" as absolute
rights.78 Bingham also referred to "absolute" rights. 79 Representative Lawrence noted "that there are certain absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a State cannot constitutionally deprive
him." 8 Senator Howard believed the fourteenth amendment embodied the
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights and the states were not free to deny
82
them. 81 The views of Congressman Bingham were the same.
If one treats as leading proponents the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate, the Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee and manager of the Civil Rights Bill in the House, the
author of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, and the Senator who
presented on behalf of the Joint Committee to the Senate, then four of the five
leading proponents of either the Civil Rights Bill or the fourteenth amendment clearly adhered to the concept of absolute rights of citizens of the United
States that states could not abridge. For that reason, Berger's attempt to use
the Civil Rights Bill to prove that no absolute rights were guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment must fail. If absolute rights were guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment, then statements Berger has combined from several
congressmen indicating that the Civil Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment were exactly the same, together with a statement from two other con74. Id at 5.
75. Eg., GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1118 (Rep. Wilson); 1757 (Sen. Trumbull); 2765-66 (Sen.
Howard).
76. Id at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull).
77. Id at 1118 (Rep. Wilson).
78. Id at 1117 (Rep. Wilson).
79. Id at 157-58 (Rep. Bingham).

80. Id at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence).
81. Id at 2765-66 (Sen. Howard).

82. Id at 2542 (Rep. Bingham).
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gressmen that the Bill merely prohibited discrimination and left states free to
grant or deny any rights they wished, 8 3 even if taken at face value, are inconsistent with the statements of leading proponents. For that reason such statements cannot be regarded as controlling.
If it is conceded that the fourteenth amendment was designed to secure
absolute and fundamental rights of citizens of the United States, then the inquiry moves to what Republicans considered those rights to be. The overwhelming evidence from the 38th and 39th Congresses indicates that
Republicans viewed rights in the Bill of Rights as rights of the citizens of the
84
United States that states could not (or in a few cases should not) deny.
There is also evidence that leading Republicans read article IV, section 2 to
embody such rights.85 Under scrutiny, Berger's argument collapses.
III.

BERGER'S TREATMENT OF 'THE FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THE
NINE-LIVED CAT ......

Berger's treatment of my own efforts to understand the fourteenth amendment are based on serious misunderstandings and misconstructions.
First, he dismisses a lengthy article by Crosskey on the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights with virtually no consideration of the article be86
cause of negative reviews of Crosskey's book Politics and the Constitution
and because of mistakes allegedly made by Crosskey in the book. The earlier
book can be used to dismiss a later article because "a leopard [can't] change
his spots." 87 Berger carries this extraordinary ad hominem argument to rehas writmarkable lengths by dismissing those who rely on anything Crosskey
'88
ten. To do so "speaks volumes" about one's "own scholarship."
Most of Berger's criticisms of my own work seem to be at least as misdirected as his dismissal of me for citing Professor Crosskey. I hope that a few
examples will be sufficient to encourage any interested reader to compare the
text of my article with Berger's criticisms of it. For example, Berger says that I
do not answer "the question, '[W]hy did [the framers] not "explicitly" write
the Bill of Rights into the [fourteenth] amendment?' "89 In my article, I noted:
Mr. Berger asks why "the Bill of Rights" was not explicitly written
into the fourteenth amendment, as due process and citizenship were.
The reason, of course, is that the rights in the Bill of Rights make up
some, and the most important, but not all of the rights of citizens of
the United States. 90
83. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 3-5.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Curtis, The FourteenthAmendment, supra note 10, at 242-56.
See GLOBE, supra note 8, at 1153, 1270 (Rep. Thayer).
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTrrTON (1953).
Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 1.
Id at 3.
Id at 13.
Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 5, at 120 (citation omitted).
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Berger also criticizes me for citing Professor Soifer's article, 9 1 ProtectingCivil
Rights. A Critiqueof Raoul Berger'sHistory, in my 1980 article
criticizing his
92
book and failing to cite in my 1980 article his 1981 reply.
He suggests that I have grossly misread cases. One question I considered
in my most recent reply to Berger was "simply as a matter of language,
whether the words 'privileges or immunities' could reasonably be read to include the rights in the Bill of Rights." 93 I recognized, of course, that the

Supreme Court never has held that the privileges or immunities clause applied
the Bill of Rights to the states.94 Still, I thought it was significant that the
Justices, when called upon to come up with a short collective description of the
rights in the Bill of Rights, often use the words "privileges" and "immunities."
It seemed to me that the Justices' use the words in this way (even in the presence of holdings that the privileges or immunities clause did not apply the Bill
of Rights to the states) was evidence that the phrase was a reasonable way for
a legislature to describe rights in the Bill of Rights. Here is how Berger deals
with this argument, made "simply as a matter of language":
Curtis cites other cases for the proposition that the "privileges or immunities" clause encompassed "the rights in the Bill of Rights," overlooking that in 1873 the Slaughter-HouseCases gutted the clause and
that Adamson v. California rejected Justice Black's95 attempt to read
the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.
Again Mr. Berger notes:
Curtis avers that Bingham "did not agree that Barron v. Baltimore
had been correctly decided" because he "believed the states were required to obey the Bill of Rights by the oath state officers took to
support the Constitution." This 96is a pretty example of circular reasoning, of assuming the answer.
By inserting a "because" not contained in the text Berger converts a sentence into a circular argument. What I wrote was:
To understand Bingham's views it is important to remember that in
1866 he did not agree that Barron v. Baltimore had been correctly
decided, that he personally believed the states were required to obey
the Bill of Rights by the oath state officers took to support the Constitution, and that he thought 97there was, in any case, no way to enforce
the obligation of this oath.
91. Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critiqueof Raoul Berger'sHistory, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv.

651 (1979).
92. Berger, A Reply, supra note 1, at 2 n. 11. For what little significance it may have, Mr.
Berger is also wrong when he says I have "nowhere. . .mentioned" Fairman's reply to Crosskey.
Id at 2. See Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment,supra note 10, at 298 n.331.
93. Curtis, Further Adventures, supra note 5,at 92.
94. Id at 92. See also Curtis, The Bill ofRights, supra note 5, at 48-49.
95. Berger, A Repl, supra note 1, at 10 (citations omitted).

96. Id at 13 (quoting Curtis, FurtherAdventures,supra note 5,at 109) (emphasis to "because
he" added) (citation omitted).
97. Curtis, FurtherAdventures, supra note 5,at 109-10 (citations omitted).
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These arguments by Berger show, I believe, a serious misunderstanding of
the article that he was criticizing.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Faced with clear direct evidence that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, Berger seeks
refuge in inferences about article IV, section 2 and about the Civil Rights Bill.
Subjected to scrutiny, however, even this indirect evidence relied on by Berger
does not support his case, and tends, indeed, to support the opposite conclusion. Some wise person has noted that raising the right questions is just as
important as giving the right answers. The questions Berger has raised about
the relation between the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Bill, and the
Bill of Rights are interesting and significant ones. He has advanced our understanding of the subject by asking them even though his answers, almost
without exception, are wrong.

